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ABSTRACT: 
Credit Default Swaps are a recent financial innovation that allow bond owners to minimize their credit risk 
exposure by purchasing an insurance on the bonds in their portfolio. By paying a quarterly fee to the 
protection seller, normally a financial institution, the protection insures that incase the issuer of bonds is 
unable to pay its interest; they will not lose any of their investment. 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate what effect announcements of acquisitions have on the acquiring 
firm’s credit default swap spread (CDS spread). To investigate this, an event study was conducted on the 
firms belonging to the Europe Itraxx 125 list between December 2007 and November 2010. In total 93 
unique acquisitions were recorded and tested included in the sample. The results of the study found that 
announcements did have a statistically significant effect on a corporation’s credit default swap spread. 
Further tests aimed at identifying what factors led to a higher or lower impact were not as successful. This is 
the first study researching the relationship between mergers and acquisitions with a firms’ credit default 
swap. The findings of this  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background  
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) were developed in the mid 1990s as way for financial institutions to 
free up capital and minimize their exposure to credit risk (O’kane 2003). A credit default swap is an 
agreement between two entities to exchange cash-flows and credit risk for a pre-determined period 
of time. A protection buyer can transfer the credit risk of a bond it owns to a protection seller by 
paying the seller a quarterly fee, known as the CDS premium. In case of a credit event by the 
reference entity (the issuer of bonds), the protection seller will cover the credit loss the protection 
buyer may suffer. Since their development, CDSs have become the most common over-the-counter 
issued credit derivatives (O’kane 2003). Since the recent financial crisis, more and more CDSs are 
traded through clearing houses and will completely disappear from the OTC market (Van Duyn & 
Mackenzie 2009). Due to the swaps dependence on credit events, they have also become a measure 
of the probability of default of the reference entity and thus given investors and banks a qualitative, 
instantaneous and efficient measure of credit risk (Jacobs, Karagozoglu & Peluso 2010).  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the changes in a company’s credit default swap spread to 
identify if announcements of acquisitions affect the company’s perceived credit risk or not. As 
mergers & acquisitions become more popular, and more companies have credit default swaps, it 
has become interesting to study the relationship between announcements of acquisitions and CDSs 
in order to learn more about what drives credit risk and what firms can do to minimize any 
negative consequences. To our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind. It is important to note 
that although this study will not determine whether acquisitions increase or decrease an acquiring 
firm’s CDS spread, it will seeks to determine whether a relationship exists and pave the way for 
future studies to determine the extent and direction of the relationship. 
 
To do identify if acquisition announcements have an effect on the CDS spread of the acquiring firm, 
and thereby on the company’s credit risk, we will use an event study. Event studies have been used 
for over 80 years as a financial and economic model to evaluate the effect an event has on, most 
commonly, a firm’s valuation (MacKinlay 1997). The event study methodology will be explained in 
more detail later in this thesis; but in its most simple form, an event study is a statistical test that 
determines if an event has an effect on a company by observing if the returns are above, or under, 
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the normal during a certain time period. Most often these returns are calculated on companies’ 
stock price, but we intend to use the same model adapted to the daily return on companies’ credit 
default swaps. Our focus in this study will be limited to the companies that make up the iTraxx 
Europe 125 index, an index of the 125 firms with the most liquid credit default swaps in Europe. 
 
As was stated previously, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that sets to focus on 
what effect acquisitions announcements have on CDS spreads. There has, however, been much 
research focused on credit default swaps, event studies and credit risk.  Made and Olszamowski 
(2008) studied what effects changes in credit ratings had on a company’s CDS spread. They found 
significant effects indicating that CDS spreads were affected by credit rating changes and 
announcements, especially by negative changes. Jacobs, Karagozoglu and Peluso (2010) also 
studied the relationship between credit ratings and CDS spreads. They found that CDS spreads 
increase (perceived credit risk goes up) as a company’s debt credit rating is lowered, which is in 
line with what Made & Olszamowski discovered. Lastly, as an example of how event studies can be 
used, Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987) used an event study to study what effect the changing of a 
company’s name had on the company’s performance. They found significant evidence proving the 
name changes were a signal of improved performance. Through our thesis, we hope to further the 
research on credit default swaps as a measure of risk, on the effects that mergers and acquisitions 
have on companies as well as give more examples of using credit default swaps in event studies.  
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not acquisition announcements have 
an effect on the acquiring firm’s credit default swap spread.  This is an interesting topic to 
study as it is the first study that attempts to relate the effect that announcements of acquisitions 
have on CDS spreads. Many studies have been conducted determining the impact that certain 
events have on CDS spreads but none where the event is an announcement of acquisitions. 
Determining what effect acquisition announcements have on CDS spreads is interesting for several 
different groups. Companies and their management want to know more about what factors 
influence their CDS spread and are especially interested in determining what effect acquiring other 
firms has on their CDS spread. Investors and banks would be interested in the results of this study 
as they are the primary buyers and sellers of CDS contracts and the ones who stand to lose the most 
in case a company fails to meet their interest payments. The more knowledge investors and banks 
have about the effects acquisitions have on CDS spreads, the better they can price bonds and swaps. 
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This study will contribute to the existing understanding of credit default swaps by introducing 
more data concerning the information content of acquisition announcements as well as on the 
impact that these announcements have on the perceived risk of acquisitions. The results of this 
study can also be used to further the research in this field and examine how firms can use 
acquisitions to minimize their risk profile, measured through their CDS spread. More examples of 
possible continued studies will be presented in the conclusion of this study. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is divided in to five different parts. In the first section, this section, we have introduced 
the reader to our thesis, given a background on what credit default swaps are, what the purpose of 
this study is and how we hope to further the discussion on credit default swaps. In the following 
section, we will introduce credit default swaps more fully:  we will briefly elaborate on their history 
as well as detail how CDSs are constructed, how the CDS spread is defined and lastly, how CDS 
indexes function. In Section 3 we will review the theoretical background as well as present the 
hypothesis, data and the methodology of the thesis. Following this presentation, in Section 4 we will 
present our empirical findings and test our hypothesis and see if we can accept or reject them. In 
the final section we will conclude our thesis, discuss the results and also suggest ways in which this 
study could be continued.  
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2. Credit Default Swaps 
In this section we will introduce Credit Default Swaps, the background to their development, 
explain how they are constructed and how the Credit Default Swap spread is calculated. We will end 
the section by discussing Credit Default Swap indexes and compare them to stock indexes. 
2.1 History 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) were originally created by investment banks in the United States in the 
mid 1990’s (Pratt).  As Figure 1 indicates, CDSs have grown incredibly since their creation and have 
now become the most traded credit derivatives. Credit Default Swaps played an important role in 
the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009. The crisis caused the outstanding amount of CDS to 
decrease drastically and also forced policy makers and central banks around the world to 
reevaluate the derivative and standardize it in order to create a simple way of managing and 
containing the effect of widespread defaults. 
Figure 1 Notional Amount Credit Default Swaps Outstanding  
 
 
The Credit Default Swap was originally created in order to minimize credit risk and to free up 
capital in the bank. Banks could use CDS to reduce their risk by buying protections on the event of a 
default by a corporation they had lent money to (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2008). For 
example, a bank could issue bonds worth $1 Billion to a corporation for five years at a 10 % interest 
rate. The corporation would make yearly interest payments of $100 Million to the bank and after 
five years it would return the principal. The bank is receiving interest on the money the corporation 
has borrowed, but if the corporation defaults the bank would stand to lose all, or a big part, of their 
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money. The bank, is in other words, exposed to a potential loss of $1 Billion if the corporation were 
to default. The bank can reduce its exposure by purchasing credit default swaps. The bank could 
contact a protection seller, often a bank or other financial institution, and buy a credit default swap. 
The bank would make regular payments to its counterparty (the seller of protection) and if the 
corporation goes into bankruptcy, the protection seller would pay the bank whatever it lost due to 
the bankruptcy (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 2008). The method previously described 
explained a case where the bank protected itself from a particular bonds issued by a certain 
corporation, but credit default swaps can also be used to reduce a bank’s exposure to an industry or 
a country. If a financial institution believes it has lent too much to a certain industry or in a country, 
it can protect (or hedge) itself by buying credit default swaps on the specific industry in the form of 
industry index CDS (Mengle 2007). 
 
The second main reason for why banks and other financial institutions would buy CDSs is for 
regulatory reasons. Most countries have rules that establish that banks must set aside a certain 
amount of cash to protect itself in case its loans go bad. By buying CDS swaps, banks can reduce the 
amount of cash they must have in their reserves and instead lend more money to other ventures 
(Weistroffer 2009). 
 
Before the standardization of the credit default swap by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) parties were free to set any terms they agreed upon in their agreements. The 
basic structure of any credit default swap is, however, quite simple. Figure 2 shows a common CDS 
agreement: Company A buys bonds issued by Company C, Company A is called the protection buyer 
and Company C as the reference entity. Company A, to protect itself from the credit risk they are 
exposed to through the bonds they bought from Company C, buys a Credit Default Swap from 
Company B, known as the protection seller. Company C will make regular interest payments to 
Company A. Company A will make regular, quarterly, payments to Company B. If Company C is 
unable to pay interest, or any other credit event occurs, such as a restructuring, a failure to pay 
interest or bankruptcy (Mengle 2007), Company B will compensate Company A on any loss they 
may have had. This will continue until the Credit Default Swap matures, usually after five years. 
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Figure 2. Illustration of a typical CDS structure 
 
 
2.2 Credit Default Swap Spreads 
The Credit Default Swap spread is the amount the protection buyer is required to pay for the 
protection offered by the protection seller. Spreads are usually quoted in basis points (one basis 
point is one hundredth of 1%) on the face value of the bond protection is bought on (O’kane & 
Tumbull 2003). In its simplest form, the spread of a credit default swap is based on the discounted 
premium payments combined with the risk-neutral probability that the reference entity defaults 
between the date of issue and the maturity of the swap (Herbertsson 2010). Although the spread is 
agreed upon by the two parties and is fixed for the duration of the CDS swap, the credit default 
swap spread is quoted daily and firms usually mark-to-market their CDSs on a daily basis (O’kane & 
Tumbull 2003).  
 
The CDS spread with maturity T for an obligor i, at time t denoted by         is defined so that the 
expected discounted cash flows paid by the protection buyer to the protection seller in the period 
[t, t+T] is equal to the expected discounted cash flows paid by the protection seller to the protection 
buyer in the same period. Hence, the T-year CDS spread for obligor i at time t is then given by 
        
        
               
 
          
   
     
    
 
   
           
 
     
 
 
 
where         is the probability of a default of obligor i up to time s for    , conditional on the 
available information at time t. Furthermore,    is the recovery rate for obligor i. A more detailed 
derivation can be found in in O’Kane 2008. For s>t>0, then the quantity         as seen from today 
(i.e. at time t=0), is a random variable in [0,1], since we don’t know the market information 
available at the future time point t. Consequently, the T-year CDS spread         at the future time 
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point t, will be treated as a random variable, just as the stock price for company i at the future time t 
is considered as a random variable. For t=0, i.e. today, it is possible to observe market spreads for 
the T-year CDS spread for obligor i, that is        . Consequently, if we have observed CDS spreads 
daily at the previous time points               (during N days, say) we can then treat these 
observations as outcomes of the corresponding random variables          for          . 
Alternatively, we may consider the observed CDS spreads as a realization of the stochastic process 
        }  sampled at the time points               .  
 
Today, it is standard to use the CDS spread of a company as a measure of the credit risk associated 
to the company (Jacobs, Karagozoglu & Peluso 2010). During the financial crisis credit default 
swaps were tracked and followed and any spike or increase would lead to much discussion over the 
chances of survival of the entity, most commonly a bank (Davies 2008).  CDS spreads as a measure 
of credit risk is an important concept in regard to this thesis because the purpose of this paper is to 
study if acquisition announcements have an effect of a firm’s credit risk, as measured through the 
firm’s credit default swap. 
2.3 How CDS Indexes Work 
A credit default swap index is a financial contract between a protection buyer and a protection 
seller on protection from credit events on a portfolio of bonds issued by multiple companies 
(Herbertsson 2010). The protection seller will reimburse the protection buyer if any company’s 
bonds included in the contract defaults or suffer any similar credit event. In exchange the 
protection buyer will make regular payments to the seller. In case one company suffers a credit 
event, the protection seller will reimburse the protection buyer for the loss suffered and the 
protection buyer will continue to make regular payments to the buyer for protection on the 
remaining bonds in the index until the maturity of their financial contract, typically five years 
(Alexander 2010). The fee that the protection buyer pays to the protection seller is referred as the 
CDS spread and is calculated in much the same way a CDS on a single firm is: by setting the 
expected cash flows between the protection seller and protection buyer equal at time t=0.  
 
Credit default swap indexes are different from stock indexes.  A stock index, in its most simple form, 
is compiled by aggregating corporate stocks, weighted by share price or market capitalization, and 
made into in index by selecting a starting point and setting the aggregated sum equal to 100. When 
the stocks in part of the index rise or fall, so will the index. The most common CDS indexes are 
created by aggregating the firms with the most liquid CDSs and weighting them equally in an index. 
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(O’Kane 2008). Stock indexes are rebalanced when needed while CDS indexes are not. Instead, new 
series of a CDS index are created every six months to include an up-to-date list of the most liquid 
firms. Most holders of a CDS index will roll over to the new index when it is released, but it is not 
required (O’Kane 2008). The new series does not necessarily have to include the same underlying 
entities as the previous series as some firms may no longer qualify (due to possible rating changes, 
liquidity issues or credit events).  
 
The main provider of CDS indexes is Markit and the most common indexes are CDX indexes in 
North America and iTraxx indexes in Asia and Europe. The index that we will use in our study is the 
Itraxx Europe 125 which will be described in more detail in section 3.3.2 in this thesis.  
 9 
 
3. Hypothesis, Data and Methodology 
Section 3 will begin by going through the most important theory this thesis is based upon: Eugene 
Fama’s Efficient Market Hypothesis. This will be followed by an introduction to the hypothesis we 
will test, the data this thesis is based upon and the method we intend to apply to test our 
hypothesis. 
3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Eugene Fama postulated that given certain assumptions, financial markets are efficient. An efficient 
market was described as a market where at any given moment in time, the prices of securities fully 
reflect all available information (Fama 1970). This hypothesis has come to be known as the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis. The assumptions that Fama required for the hypothesis to be valid are that 
markets are active markets, with many profit-maximizing participants who all had access to the 
latest information.  
 
Fama’s reasoning for why markets are efficient is based on the idea that investors are profit-
maximizers who will look at all available information before making their judgment on the value of 
a security. The price of any security will be efficient as it will reflect the collective knowledge of the 
entire market. Prices of securities will rise until no investor believes they will be able to make a 
profit by buying the security; this will lead the security to stabilize at an efficient level (Fama 1970). 
When new information is available (for example at an earnings announcement or an acquisition 
announcement), investors will re-evaluate the security given the new information and the price will 
either fall or rise depending on the information content of the introduced information. Fama 
identified three different levels of efficient markets: weak-form, semi-strong-form and strong-form. 
Below we will explain each level and discuss how they relate to each other. 
 
In the first category, weak-form markets, prices fully reflect all available past information 
concerning the price of an asset. This would imply that it would not be possible to, in the long run, 
earn profits above what would be considered normal, by using a trading strategy based on technical 
analysis, the studying of historic prices to look for patterns that can predict future prices (Malkiel). 
On the other hand, trading strategies based on fundamental analysis (analyzing a company by 
looking at more factors than just historic prices, for example the firm’s market and its management) 
would lead to outperformance. Fama’s evidence suggests that these are the most common types of 
efficient markets as the category is the easiest to prove. 
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Semi-strong form markets are market where security prices reflect all available public information. 
This would imply that security price movements are based on the arrival of new information to the 
public. In semi-strong-form markets, the only way to outperform the markets in the long run would 
be to trade based on private insider-information. Neither fundamental nor technical analysis would 
lead to market outperformance as this information is already priced in. Although weak-form 
markets are the most common types of markets, Fama and others have found evidence that indicate 
that semi-strong markets do exist. For example, several studies have found that active fund 
management (where fund managers try to pick stocks that will outperform) does not add value to 
investors (Jensen 1968 and Malkiel 1995). Malkiel also found that that active fund managers are 
“regularly outperformed” by broad index funds (Malkiel 2003). This would be evidence that stock 
picking is, in the long-run, useless if only based on fundamental and technical analysis and should 
be replaced by passive fund management, the holding of large, diversified portfolios. 
 
Strong-form markets are markets where asset prices fully reflect all available public and private 
information. This would imply that not even by trading on insider information would fund 
managers be able to outperform the market as there is no such thing as inside-information. Fama 
admits that this is a rare kind of market but believes that the classification is interesting as a 
benchmark for the previous two forms of efficient markets. 
 
One of the primary implications of the efficient market hypothesis is that it assumes that security 
prices are moved by the arrival of new information. This would reject the idea that stock pickers 
and fund managers can successfully and consistently outperform the market. If markets are 
efficient, there can be no price anomalies that managers can take advantage of. Prices will only go 
up or down when new information is introduced; and as it is impossible to say what new 
information will be made available, and whether that information will be positive or negative, stock 
picking would be pure speculation. 
 
We assume that the European CDS market is a semi-strong efficient market. This is an important 
assumption as we will be analyzing the deviation of returns compared to their “normal return” 
throughout certain time periods. The semi-strong-form assumes that asset prices adjust when new 
information is introduced. This study will focus on acquisition announcements being the new 
information that is added. In the hypothesis we are expecting that the announcements will have a 
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noticeable effect on the returns. We believe that assuming that the CDS market is semi-strong is a 
valid assumption because other studies have already been conducted using the same assumption. 
Made & Olszamowski used this assumption and found significant levels information content in 
several credit events. 
3.2 Our Hypothesis 
In this subsection we will introduce the hypothesis that will be tested in this thesis. 
 
H1: The information content of acquisition announcement is high and we will see a reaction 
to the announcements in the CDS spreads 
In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, any new information with high information 
content introduced to the market will cause the market to re-evaluate the firm and the firm’s risk 
level. The first hypothesis will test whether or not the information content in acquisition 
announcements is sufficiently high to affect CDS spreads or not. 
 
We will not test whether acquisitions increase or reduce the credit default spread of firms because 
the direction of change is outside of the scope of this study. The reasoning behind this is that we 
want to focus on identifying if there is information content in acquisitions announcements or not. 
However, although the direction of the change will not be the focus of this study, we will, where 
data permits us, comment on the direction. 
 
H2: Acquisitions of companies outside of the acquirer’s industry class (inter-industry 
acquisitions) will have higher information content and thus see a higher impact compared 
with intra-industry acquisitions 
Intra-industry acquisitions, acquisitions where both the acquiring firm and target firm belong to the 
same industry will notice a smaller effect compared with inter-industry acquisitions, acquisition 
where there is no industry match between acquiring firm and target firm. The reasoning behind 
this hypothesis is that acquisitions within the same industry should be less risky compared with 
inter-industry acquisitions. In inter-industry acquisitions the acquiring firm is acquiring a firm 
involved in activities outside of its core competencies which is more risky compared with an intra-
industry acquisitions. 
 
Although this study will not directly focus on the spread of the acquiring firm, we can still make the 
separation above as we are looking at cumulative abnormal returns during certain time periods. 
 12 
 
Higher impact will be studied by looking at the cumulative abnormal return.  We expect that inter-
industry acquisitions will have a higher cumulative abnormal return compared with intra-industry 
cumulative returns. 
 
H3: Acquisitions by frequent acquirers will notice a smaller effect compared with companies 
who do not often engage in M&A  
Companies that frequently acquire other companies should be more accustomed to acquiring 
companies and incorporating them into their existing business and therefore see smaller effects on 
their spread than firms that seldom acquire other firms. The buyers of credit default swaps on the 
bonds of companies that often acquire firms are also accustomed to the strategies of the company 
and therefore the effect of an acquisition announcement should already be priced into the CDS 
spread. There should be a more pronounced effect on firms that do not frequently acquire other 
firms as the holders of the companies’ CDS will not have priced in this in the price of its CDS. 
 
The information content in acquisitions by companies that do not frequently acquire other firms 
will be higher than companies where investors expect them to acquire as the information content 
includes a certain amount of surprise. 
 
Frequent acquirers are firms that have conducted two or more acquisitions in the time period of 
this study. This is not a perfect measurement as there may be firms who have completed many 
acquisitions right before or after the boundaries of this study who will be classified as not frequent 
acquirers. Notwithstanding this possible limitation, we still believe that this segmentation will be 
insightful. 
 
H4: Acquisitions in Brazil, Russia, India or China will have a higher impact than acquisitions 
outside of Emerging Markets 
Acquisitions where either the acquiring firm or the target firm is located in Brazil, Russia, India or 
China (BRIC countries) will see a stronger response compared with firms that are not related to 
BRIC-countries. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is based on the inherent risk of acquisitions 
in emerging markets compared with in mature markets.   
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3.3 The Data 
In the following section we will begin by presenting the data that will be used in the study, the 
source of the data and how it has been handled. Thereafter we will present the event study 
methodology and introduce the reader to the statistical tests we will use to test our hypothesis. 
3.3.1 Overview 
The primary source for credit default swap spreads and for acquisition announcements is Reuters 
3000. We have chosen to use the CDS spreads of the five-year maturity CDS contracts as they are 
the most liquid contracts; using the most liquid contracts is important in order satisfy the 
assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis. This study will focus on looking at acquisitions by 
firms in the market index between the 17th of December 2007 and the 15th of November 2010. 
These were tumultuous years in the CDS-market but we do not believe that this will have any 
effects on our results as our study is based on comparing returns above what would be considered 
normal and also compared to the overall market performance. 
3.3.2 Market Index 
In subsection 2.3 we introduced the concept of CDS indexes. In this section we will present the 
market index we have chosen to use for our study.  
 
We have decided to use Markit’s Itraxx Europe List as our market index. The Itraxx Europe List is an 
index composed of the Credit Default Swap spreads of the 125 most liquid investment-grade 
European firms and every firm in the list accounts for 0.8 % of the list exposure. It was developed to 
give a benchmark index for both investors and asset managers for their CDS investments. The index 
is rebalanced every March and September, to ensure that the list always contains the 125 most 
liquid investment-grade firms in Europe. Given that the Itraxx Europe list is such a broad index, we 
have chosen not attempt to change or correct the data in any way to take into consideration the 
changes caused by rebalancing. The list contains companies from all major industries. The exact 
breakdown by industry group is presented in Table 1. A list of the firms in the index is available in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 1 iTraxx Europe Industry Composition 
Industry No. of Companies Weight in % 
Autos & Industrials 30 24 
Consumers 30 24 
Energy 20 16 
Financials 25 20 
Technology, Media & Telecom 20 16 
Total 125 100 % 
Source: iTraxx 
 
3.3.3 Acquisitions 
In total there were 104 acquisitions in our date range. From the 104 acquisitions, 11 were removed 
from the study as there was not enough CDS data to calculate accurate normal returns, which is 
required to be able to use the event study methodology we will present in a later section. Appendix 
2 includes a complete list of the acquisitions observed in this study. 
 
The first hypothesis tests all acquisition announcements while the remaining three hypothesis test 
different segmentations of acquisition announcements. Segmenting acquisitions into different 
groups is interesting in order to test and see if the information content of the acquisitions is 
different depending on the type of acquisition. A side effect of segmenting the acquisitions is that 
we are left with smaller sample sizes. In some cases this will mean we will not be able to assume 
that the data is normally distributed. This is a setback but we believe the segmentations are 
interesting nonetheless. Some acquisitions are more risky than others and these announcements 
should therefore have a more significant impact on the CDS spread. The segmentations are:  
 Intra-industry acquisitions: Acquisitions where the acquiring firm and target firm are in 
the same industry.  
 Inter-industry acquisitions: Acquisitions where the acquiring firm and target firm are in 
the different industry.  
 Frequent acquirer: Acquisition by a firm that has conducted multiple acquisitions within 
the thesis studied time frame.  
 Rare acquirer: Acquisitions by a firm that has conducted only one acquisition within the 
time frame of this study.  
 BRIC Related: Acquisitions where either acquiring firm and/or target firm is a Brazilian, 
Russian, Indian or Chinese firm.  
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 BRIC Unrelated: Acquisitions where there is no relation to any BRIC-country.  
In Table 2 we show the number of acquisitions in each segment: 
Table 2 Frequency of Announcement Type 
Type of Acquisition Number of Acquisitions 
Number of Acquisitions (Events) (Al) 
Intra-industry Acquisitions (intra) 
Inter-industry Acquisitions (Inter) 
Frequent acquirer (Often) 
Rare acquirer (N.Often) 
BRIC Related Acquisitions (BRIC) 
BRIC Unrelated Acquisitions (N.BRIC) 
93 
72 
21 
68 
25 
10 
83 
 
3.3.4 Credit Default Swap Spread Over Time 
Figure 3 Average Credit Default Swap Spread and Date of Acquisitions 14th December 2007 – 15th November 2010 
 
 
In Figure 3 we shows how the average credit default swap spread for the 93 firms has moved 
between the 17th of December 2007 and the 15th of November 2010. The average spread was 84.70 
basis points, min 48.8 on the 17th of December 2007 and max 179 on the 16th December 2008. As 
stated before, the time period between 2007 and 2010 includes the recent financial crisis, a crisis 
where credit default swaps played a central role (Davies 2008). The crisis is evident in the graph 
above, the average CDS spread increased by more than 300 % between December 2007 and 
December 2008, after which it steadily decreased and returned to a more stable level. 
 
The lighter blue line in the graph above shows the cumulative number of acquisitions. There reason 
that there are no acquisitions in the beginning is due to the requirement of having an estimation 
window between the period t=-150 and t=-10 to calculate normal returns. Acquisitions are spread 
out over time with no particular clustering. 
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3.4 The Methodology 
In this subsection we will present the Event Study methodology formalized by A. Craig MacKinlay. 
This will be followed by an introduction to the statistical test we will use to test our hypothesis.  
3.4.1 Introduction 
A. Craig MacKinlay has in his influential work, Event Studies in Economic and Finance, compiled all 
background information concerning event studies and also formalized the event study 
methodology. Event studies are based on calculating the cumulative abnormal returns of a security 
around the time period of an event (MacKinlay 1997). The abnormal returns are then statistically 
tested to identify whether the returns are statistically different from zero. The reason for why the 
returns are tested to see if they are statistically different than zero is because, in accordance with 
the efficient market hypothesis, prices increase or decrease only when new information is added. If 
we can prove that the returns are statistically different than zero we can conclude that the event 
had an impact. 
 
Although event studies can be conducted on most securities, so far the most common security used 
in the available literature are stocks. We will use credit default swaps as the underlying security 
and use the same methodology that Made & Olszamowski introduced for calculating abnormal 
returns on credit default swaps. They observe the daily buy-and-hold returns of CDSs to study what 
effect rating announcements have on firms’ CDS spread. The daily buy-and-hold returns are 
calculated in the following manner: 
     
    
      
   
                  
                      
   
    
      
   
Where,       Return of issuer i on day t 
      Expected present value of all payments the buyer of a CDS contract makes to the seller 
               Present value of one basis point stream of premia on day t 
      CDS spread for issuer i on day t 
 
The formula states that the return for issuer i on day t is     . Made & Olszamowski make an 
assumption that                              . The reasoning behind this assumption is that 
              is the “probability that the issuer does not default prior to a certain payment date” 
(Made och Olszamowski) and as the time between t and t-1 is just one trading day, we can assume 
the value will be the same, or nearly the same, from one day to the other.   
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As proposed by Mackinlay in his previously mentioned work, expected returns will be calculated 
using the market model, a model that determines how a security moves in relation to the market. 
The market model method of calculating abnormal returns relates the return of issuer i to the 
return of the market portfolio (Mackinlay 1997). An estimation period is selected from which the 
returns of the issuer and the market will be related to create expected returns. The estimation 
period should not include the event as its inclusion may skew the model. The estimation period in 
this study is between t=-150 and t=-10 days. Figure 4 gives a brief summary of the different periods 
of time that will be used. 
 
Figure 4 Estimation Period and Event Windows 
 
 
Event studies are based on observing if there are any cumulative abnormal returns over a period of 
times surrounding an event. In our case, the event is an acquisition announcement by a firm. An 
estimation period is used to calculate normal returns. Later, abnormal returns are calculated by 
comparing actual returns with the returns our model predicted. Cumulative abnormal returns are 
created by summing all abnormal returns over a given time period, known as event windows. If the 
announcement of an acquisition has no effect, the cumulative abnormal returns in the period will be 
insignificant and equal to zero. If this proves to be false, one can assume that the event had an 
impact on the security price (MacKinlay 1997). We will focus on four different event windows in 
order to make sure that we are able to identify any information leakage before the event as well as 
any corrections after the event. The event windows are: 
t=-60 and t=-11: Pre event window. By observing the abnormal returns before the event, 
information leakage can be detected. 
t=-10 and t=-1: Similar to the pre-event window proposed above but more focused on the 
time right before the event. 
t=0 and t=1: Event window including the release of the information. Check the market 
reaction. 
t=2 and t=10: Post even window. Observe the market adjustment process 
t=-150            t= -100      t= -50   t=0 t=10 
              Event 
                       Estimation Period  
Event Windows: #1          #2   #3      #4 
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3.4.2 Calculating Abnormal Returns 
As previously mentioned, abnormal returns are calculated by comparing actual returns (    ) with 
the returns our model has predicted (                 ):  
                        
Where,     Abnormal return for issuer i during time t, that is the difference between the actual 
return for issuer i compared with the expected return given our model 
      = Is the actual return for issuer i during time t 
                                  
                    Expected return for issuer i given our model 
      = The actual return for the market index m during time t  
    An estimate of the intercept for issuer i in the market model. This number has no real 
significance but is included to make our predictions more reliable. 
    An estimate of beta for issuer i. Defined as the correlation between the daily returns of 
issuer i and the market index 
     Error term with zero mean 
 
Abnormal returns for issuer i at time t are calculated as the return of issuer i at time t in excess of 
the market return at the same time. Expected returns, including    and   , are calculated using 
standard ordinary least square regressions.  
 
The abnormal returns for the issuer are aggregated over time in order to create cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR): 
                  
  
    
 
As we are investigating the relationship between acquisition announcements and CDS spreads, we 
have to aggregate multiple different cases of acquisition announcements and create a sample of 
announcements. This is done by aggregating the cumulative abnormal returns across our sample to 
create the Sample Aggregated Cumulative Abnormal Return (SACAR): 
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3.4.3 Testing For Significance 
We will use a Student’s two sided t-test to test whether or not acquisition announcements have an 
effect on the CDS returns. Student, whose real name was William Sealy Gosset, worked as a chemist 
and statistician for the Guinness Brewery in Dublin. He developed his t-test as a statistical method 
to test the quality of the brew produced by the brewery (J. J O’Connor and E F Robertson 2003). To 
test the quality of the beer he took many small samples and compared their properties to what was 
considered normal. He tested if the properties were significantly different from what was expected 
by comparing the calculated sample means with a normal distribution. If the calculated average of 
his sample was significantly different, the brew was considered to be of low quality and would be 
rejected. Credit default swaps are quite different from Guinness, but the testing method Gosset 
created can be used to test how a sample of values compare with what is considered normal (Raju 
TN 2005).  
 
The null hypothesis in our test is that the sample aggregated cumulative abnormal returns (SACAR) 
are equal to zero, in other words that there is no impact. The alternative hypothesis is that SACAR is 
not equal to zero.  The reasoning behind the null hypothesis is: if there is no impact on the CDS 
spread by the announcement, according to the efficient market hypothesis, there should not be any 
cumulative abnormal returns either. By testing whether SACAR is equal to zero we test if the 
cumulative abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. To test this statistical 
significance of the returns predicted by the model, standardized test statistics are constructed.  
SACAR is divided by the sample variance to construct standardized prediction error: 
   
            
                  
        
The resulting standardized prediction error has a 0 mean and variance of 1 and can be used to test 
the null hypothesis (MacKinlay 1997) by comparing    to a critical value. If   is larger than the 
critical value, or less than the negative critical value (because this is a two-sided test), we can reject 
the null hypothesis. An alternative to using critical values are to use probability-values, p-values. P-
values indicate the lowest value at which the null hypothesis can be rejected. We will reject our null 
hypothesis if the calculated p-value is less than our chosen significance level, 0.05. P-values are 
preferable to critical values because they give us a clearer understanding of how confident we are 
when we reject, or fail to reject, our hypothesis. For example, if the calculated p-value is 0.06 we fail 
to reject our null hypothesis, but we know we are fairly close. If the calculate p-value is 0.45 we 
know we can safely reject our null hypothesis. 
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4. Empirical Findings 
In the following section we present and analyze the results of our study. We will begin by 
examining the main question: do acquisition announcements have any effect on the CDS spread of 
the acquiring firm? After going through the main hypothesis, we will examine the effects of more 
specific sorts of acquisitions as well as present the results from our statistical tests which will lead 
us to reject, or fail to reject, our hypothesis.. 
4.1 Daily and Accumulated Changes 
In this subsection we will present and discuss the empirical findings for all acquisitions using 
charts. 
4.1.1 All Acquisitions 
Figures 5 and 6, below, display the daily and cumulative abnormal returns for our sample set 
between the time period t=-10 to t=10 and also t=-30 to t=10. These periods show any pre-event 
changes and post-event changes as well as changes on the date of the actual event. Observing the 
daily and cumulative returns during these two time periods is interesting as it gives us a way to 
observe the effects of the event and any pre- or post-adjustments indicating information leakage or 
over reactions. 
Figure 5 Average Abnormal CDS Return for the period t=-10 to t=10 for all acquisition announcements 
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Figure 6 Average Abnormal CDS Return for the period t=-30 to t=10 for all acquisition announcements 
 
 
Figure 5 and 6 indicate that acquisition announcements coincide with a tightening of the acquiring 
firm’s CDS spread. Between t=-10 and t=10, the cumulative abnormal return is almost -4.0 %. The 
daily abnormal returns are for the most part negative, indicating a tightening or a decreasing CDS 
spread which would indicate a decrease in the perceived risk of the acquirer.  
 
From Figures 5 and 6, there is no clear visual indication that the announcement of an acquisition at 
t=0 has an immediate effect on the abnormal return. The average abnormal return at t=0 is -0.18 %. 
t=0 is followed by two consecutive days of positive abnormal returns indicating a possible increase 
in perceived risk which could have been caused by the acquisition announcement. This may be a 
belated response to the information content of the announcement at t=0. 
 
Looking at a longer period (Figure 6) it becomes clear that the tightening of the CDS spread is a 
trend that started earlier than what the first Figure 5 would explain. This indicates that the returns 
between t=-10 and t=10 are not adjustment of previous increases but rather just a continuation of 
an ongoing trend.  
 
One clear pattern that becomes visible is that the majority of the daily returns are negative. The 
returns seem to be fairly random with certain trends, negative events are usually followed by other 
negative events and positive events are often followed by positive events. Although the trend is 
towards a tightening of the spread, there are occasional positive adjustments.   
4.1.2 t=-10 – t=10 Cumulative For Different Types of Acquisitions 
Below we have plotted the cumulative returns for all different types of acquisitions in order to 
make it easier to compare and contrast the abnormal returns in the different segments of 
acquisitions. 
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Figure 7 Abnormal CDS Returns for different types of acquisitions between  t=-10 and t=10  
  
 
From the graph it becomes evident that there are clear positive returns for inter-industry 
acquisitions and BRIC-related-acquisitions. There are minor cumulative returns for all acquisitions 
and for both frequent and non-frequent acquirers. Intra-industry acquisitions and non-BRIC-related 
acquisitions have a clear negative cumulative return. 
 
Although the graph above shows some interesting trends, it is important to remember that the 
cumulative returns have not been statistically tested and that we are simply commenting on the 
visible abnormal return trends. These results are not surprising. Inter-industry acquisitions and 
BRIC-related acquisitions should result in an increase in the CDS spread as they are more risky. 
When a firm acquires a firm from a different industry, the potential risk is higher than when both 
acquiring and target firms are in the same industry. The same is true for BRIC-related acquisitions. 
BRIC-related acquisitions imply that a firm is expanding geographically which would imply taking 
more risks. The only surprising results are that there is no difference between firms that often 
engage in acquisitions compared with firms that do not.  
4.2 Event Study Results 
In this subsection we will present the results of the statistical tests and discuss what they mean to 
our hypothesis.  
4.2.1 H1. There will be an effect 
Table 4 shows the sample cumulative abnormal returns and the P-value from the student’s t-test for 
all acquisition announcements during our 5 different time periods. 
Table 4 SACAR and P-values for T-Test For Acquisition Announcements  
 -60 to -11 -10 to -1 0 to 1 2 to 10 -10 to 10 
SACAR -7.170 %*** -0.0088 % -0.142 %** -1.577 %* -1.807%** 
P-Value 0.000720641 0.429136721 0.019246187 0.05363899 0.017540427 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively for one-sided hypothesis testing of value equal to zero 
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The results indicate that there are significant abnormal returns during all time periods except for 
between t=-10 to t=-1. During the event window t=-60 to t=-11 the cumulative abnormal returns 
are -7.17% which is significant at the 1 % level. In the most important event window, t=0 to t=1, the 
abnormal returns are significant at the 5% level indicating that announcements of acquisitions 
have, on average, a significant effect on a firms credit default swap spread. This leads us to accept 
our hypothesis that acquisitions have an effect. The direction of the cumulative abnormal returns in 
the period t=0 to t=1 is negative indicating that an announcement is usually followed by a decrease 
in the CDS spread. 
 
The primary hypothesis of this study was that we would see a reaction in CDS spreads due to 
announcements. The cumulative changes between t=0 and t=1 for all acquisitions are significantly 
different than zero which would imply that investors react to the new information released at t=0 . 
This information is useful as we can determine that acquisitions will have an impact on firm’s CDS 
spread and in return, their perceived risk level. 
4.2.2 H2. Intra- and Inter-Industry Acquisitions 
Figure 8 shows the sample cumulative abnormal returns between t=-10 and t=10 segmented into 
two groups: acquisitions where both acquirer and target firms belong to the same industry (Intra) 
and where acquirer and target belong to different industry groups (Inter). 
Figure 8 Abnormal CDS Returns for the period t=-10 to t=10 for Intra- and Inter-Industry Acquisitions 
 
 
Figure 8 indicates that acquisitions where there is an industry match between acquirer and target 
result in a tightening of the CDS spread while the opposite is true for acquisitions between industry 
classes during the time period t=-10 and t=10. In Table 5, the results from the statistical tests are 
presented. 
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Table 5 SACAR and P-values for T-Test For Intra-/Inter-Industry Acquisitions 
 
 -60 to -11 -10 to -1 0 to 1 2 to 10 -10 to 10 
SACAR Intra -5.703 % *** -1.816 % ** -0.394 % ** -1.792 %* -4.001%*** 
Inter -11.572 % *** 5.096 % *** 0.611 % -0.931 %* 4.776%*** 
P-Value Intra 0.00008204 0.016503536 0.01594924 0.054096904 0.002382909 
Inter 0.005868754 0.00085896 0.103163507 0.074645117 0.001042139 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively for one-sided hypothesis testing of value equal to zero 
 
From Table 5 we see that there is significance in most time periods. That intra-industry acquisitions 
is significant to the 5% level between t=0 and t=1 indicates that the information content of the 
acquisition is significant. Inter-industry acquisitions are not significant at the same time interval 
and we can thus not test which had a higher impact. At the t=-10 to t=-1 period both intra- and 
inter-industry acquisitions are significant at the 5% level in the direction that we can expect. Intra-
industry acquisitions should coincide with a lower increase in CDS spread than inter-industry 
acquisitions.  
 
One anomaly in Table 5 is that Inter-industry acquisitions have a sample cumulative abnormal 
return of almost -12 % during the time period t=-60 to t=-11, this is not what is expected. Looking 
at a longer time period though (see appendix Figure 3.3 t=-150 to t=10) it is clear that this is an 
adjustment from a previous, very strong increase of the CDS spread.  
 
Our second hypothesis stated that acquisitions where there is no industry match between acquiring 
firm and acquired firm (inter-industry acquisitions) should have more pronounced reactions 
compared with acquisitions where there is a match can be regarded as inconclusive. The data says 
that there is a significant reaction to acquisitions where there is an industry match between the 
time period t=0 and t=1 but for acquisitions with no industry match, no such significant results 
were identified. The cumulative abnormal returns are in accordance with our hypothesis (larger 
cumulative abnormal returns for non-industry match acquisitions) but as the results are not 
statistically significant we can neither accept nor reject the hypothesis.  
4.2.3 H3. Frequent announcers 
The abnormal CDS returns for frequent (Often) and infrequent (N.Often) acquisition 
announcements between t=-10 and t=10 are plotted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Abnormal CDS Returns for the period t=-10 to t=10 for Often and N.Often Acquisitions 
 
 
Figure 9 does not indicate that there is any clear, visual, evidence of strong information content 
regarding acquisitions in the event window between t=-10 and t=10. Neither are there any clear 
differences between firms that often engage in acquisitions compared with firms that rarely acquire 
other firms. However, by looking at a longer period (see Figure 3.3 in appendix), firms that often 
acquire other firms have a negative cumulative abnormal return. Firms that seldom acquire other 
firms can expect positive cumulative abnormal returns during the same, extended, time period. 
Table 6 SACAR and P-values for T-Test For Often/N.Often Acquisitions  
 -60 to -11 -10 to -1 0 to 1 2 to 10 -10 to 10 
SACAR Often -11.590 %*** -0.332 % -0.052 % -1.500 % ** -1.883%** 
N. Often 4.048 %*** 0.532 % -0.372 % -1.772 % -1.612%** 
P-Value Often 0.000347364 0.29889085 0.389724735 0.049887544 0.02642097 
N. Often 0.004991072 0.165581341 0.176542696 0.101894825 0.04540419 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively for one-sided hypothesis testing of value equal to zero 
 
Our hypothesis stated that acquisitions done by firms that often conduct acquisitions should have a 
lower information content compared with acquisition announcements by firms that seldom acquire 
firms seems cannot be proved true. From Table 6 we see that, at the most important event window, 
t=0-t=1, there are no indications of any significant changes in returns for either segment. During the 
time period t=-60 and t=-11, Often acquirers can expect to see cumulative negative CDS spread 
returns amounting to -11.59 %, signifying a lower CDS spread, whilst firms that rarely acquire 
other firms can expect to positive cumulative abnormal returns. Both of these are significant at the 
1 % level but it is impossible to determine if this is caused by the acquisition announcement or not. 
4.2.4 H3. BRIC Announcements 
Figure 10 shows the abnormal CDS returns between t=-10 and t=10 segmented in to two group: 
BRIC-related acquisitions and non-BRIC-related acquisitions. 
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Figure 10 Abnormal CDS Returns for the period t=-10 to t=10 for BRIC and N. BRIC  Acquisitions 
 
 
Figure 9 indicates that BRIC-related acquisitions show positive cumulative abnormal returns while 
non-BRIC related acquisitions show no or negative returns. BRIC-related firms seem to be affected 
by the acquisition announcement at t=0 resulting in a series of days with positive CDS returns, the 
same does not seem to be true for non-BRIC related acquisitions.  
 
Table 7 SACAR and P-values for T-Test For BRIC/N.BRIC Related Acquisitions  
 -60 to -11 -10 to -1 0 to 1 2 to 10 -10 to 10 
SACAR BRIC -9.497 %*** 1.360 % -0.321 % 1.124 % 2.163%** 
N. BRIC -6.887 %*** -0.264 % -0.121 %*** -1.906 %** -2.291%*** 
P-Value BRIC 0.001563725 0.157213232 0.15937407 0.145642357 0.039789288 
N. BRIC 0.0007633 0.313417067 0.000225666 0.045446111 0.009839322 
*, ** and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively for one-sided hypothesis testing of value equal to zero 
 
From Table 7 we can see that the cumulative returns in the period t=-10 to t=10 are significant at 
the 5% level for both BRIC-related acquisitions and non-BRIC-related acquisitions. However only 
non-BRIC-related acquisitions are significant at the t=0 to t=1 period indicating that the 
announcement of an acquisition at t=0 had an impact. 
 
The hypothesis testing whether acquisitions where either one or both firms are based in one of the 
BRIC countries show higher impact compared with non-BRIC-related acquisitions cannot be 
determined. Non-BRIC-related acquisitions show significant cumulative abnormal returns between 
t=0 and t=1, but BRIC-related acquisition do not show similar significance. 
 
The sample of BRIC-related acquisitions consists of only 10 acquisitions which lead us to question 
the robustness and validity of the results in Table 7 and Figure 10. We have nonetheless decided 
include the groupings in the study as we believe it is an interesting perspective to study. 
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4.3 Volatility 
If the information content of acquisition announcements is strong we expect that the market will 
react to the new information on, or around, the day of the announcement. We have therefore 
included a short analysis on the volatility of the abnormal returns around the acquisition date, t=0.   
 
As an indicator of volatility we have chosen to present the distribution of the abnormal returns 
around the event windows in Figure 11. The black vertical lines are two standard deviations of 
returns and the black horizontal line is the average return. A more spread out distribution of 
abnormal returns, that is longer vertical lines, would be an indication of heightened volatility.   
Figure 11 Volatility of Abnormal Returns For All Acquisitions 
A) t = -30 – t=10 B) t= -10 – t=10 
  
 
Neither Figure 11 A nor figure 11 B seem to indicate that there is in any heightened volatility during 
the time periods t=-30 to t=10. We see an increase in volatility one week before the announcement, 
perhaps indicating information leakage but there is no way to prove this given the information we 
have.  Our results contrast to the results of Made & Olszamwoski. They found significant evidence of 
increases in volatility around the announcement date for negative announcements (credit grade 
downgrades and other similar announcements or warnings).  
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5. Conclusion 
In this section we will conclude the study, include closing remarks concerning the methodology and 
also provide examples for how this study can be extended. 
 
The results from study indicate that announcemenets of acquisitions have a significant and 
noticeable impact on the CDS spread of the acquiring firm at several different time periods, 
including the most important itme period between t=0 and t=1. The results are interesting and 
p2insightful. Interesting as they indicate that a firm’s CDS spread is impacted by the acquisitions 
they complete and the firm must therefore take into consideration what effect an acquisition will 
have on their CDS spread when acquiring firms. The results are insightful as they give further 
evidence that the perceived risk of a firm can be adjusted by investments and divestments of 
businesses and business units. 
 
The exact way that acquisitions impact CDS spreads has not been studied in this thesis. Focus lay 
instead on identifying if acquisition announcements had an impact on CDS spreads or not, not on 
the direction of the impact. Studying the direction of the impact would be insightful as it would give 
proof to the question of: do acquisitions increase or decrease a company’s credit default swap? The 
results of a study like that could be used to create trading strategies and also risk management. 
 
Due to statistical uncertainty in the segemented acquisitions, only the first hypothesis could be 
statistically tested. The remaining hypothesis could not be tested as the significance levels in the 
returns were not high enough. Once again, the segmentations were interesting as the results would 
shed more light on exactly what kind of acquisitions impacted CDS swaps the most. One of the main 
problems in these segmentations was that the sample sizes were too small; we had, for example, 
only 10 BRIC-related acquisitions. As was stated in 3.3.3., not all samples used in the study could be 
assumed to be normally distributed, meaning that the results from running statistical tests on the 
samples were not all reliable. If this study were to be continue, we would want to extend the time 
frame we observed in order to increase the number of observations in each sample. Even if some 
samples could not be assumed to be normally distributed, we believe that the results are 
meaningful and interesting. 
 
This is the first paper that, to our knowledge, studies the effect of acquisition announcements on 
CDS spreads. The study of this paper has just touched on a tiny part of a very interesting subject; 
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and we believe that there are several ways in which this study could be continued which would lead 
to both interesting and useful knowledge about how acquisition announcements affect CDS spreads. 
Below we have suggest four ideas for how this studied could be continued, but there are many, 
many more. 
 
Although we have briefly mentioned the direction of the impact acquisitions had when we stated 
the results from the study, the focus of this study lay in identifying if there was an impact or not. We 
believe that by reframing this study and focusing on the direction of impact, we would gain insights 
in to how exactly different types of acquisitions impact CDS spreads. This information could be used 
to identify possible trading strategies as investors could develop strategies taking advantage of the 
expected changes in CDS based possible rumors.  
 
One very important factor that was left out of this study due to insufficient data was the size of the 
acquisition being announced. We are certain that this is an important factor which would lead to 
very interesting and even more meaningful results. A major weakness of this study is that large 
acquisitions and small acquisitions are both treated the same. Large acquisitions will undoubtedly 
have a higher impact on CDS spreads than a small acquisition. We would suggest re-doing this study 
and focus on acquisitions where the size of the acquisition was announced. A further very 
interesting factor to include would be a ratio of the size of the acquisition compared with the 
acquiring firm. This would give more context to the size of the acquisition than simply including the 
sum of the transaction. 
 
A fourth suggestion would be to combine the event study on a company’s credit default swap 
spread with a similar study on the same firm’s stock price. By combining the stock price 
information with the information contained in the credit default swap spread of a company, we 
would be able to compare and contrast what stock investors thought of the proposed deal with 
bond investors.  
 
Lastly, it would be interesting to do a similar analysis as this study but changing the event from 
acquisitions to divestments. What happens when a firm sells-off a major business unit or subsidiary 
company? A study of this would be interesting for many of the same reasons for why this study is 
interesting: analyzing the impact of perceived risk and effects of divestments; this is also something 
that, to our knowledge, has never been studied before.  
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Appendix 
1. iTraxx 125 Europe Series 13 List of Companies 
AAUK Anglo American plc  
ACAFP CREDIT AGRICOLE S 
ADO Adecco S.A.  
AEGON Aegon N.V.  
AHOLD Koninklijke Ahold N.V. 
AKZO AKZO Nobel N.V.  
ALSTOM ALSTOM  
ALZSE Allianz SE  
ARMLL ArcelorMittal  
ASSGEN ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI - SOCIETA PER 
AZIONI  
AUCHAN GROUPE AUCHAN  
AVLN AVIVA PLC  
AXAF AXA  
AYLL SAFEWAY LIMITED  
BACR-Bank BARCLAYS BANK PLC  
BAD EnBW Energie Baden-Wuerttemberg AG  
BAPLC BAE SYSTEMS PLC  
BASFSE BASF SE  
BATSLN BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO p.l.c.  
BBVSM  
BERTEL Bertelsmann AG  
BMW Bayerische Motoren Werke 
Aktiengesellschaft  
BNP BNP PARIBAS  
BPLN BP P.L.C.  
BPSC BANCO POPOLARE SOCIETA COOPERATIVA  
BRITEL-BritTel BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
public limited company  
BYIF Bayer Aktiengesellschaft  
CARR CARREFOUR  
CDBRYH CADBURY HOLDINGS LIMITED  
CENTRI Centrica Plc  
CMZB COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft  
CPGLN COMPASS GROUP PLC  
CSGAG Credit Suisse Group Ltd  
DAMLR Daimler AG  
DANONE DANONE  
DB DEUTSCHE BANK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT  
DEXO SODEXO  
DIAG DIAGEO PLC  
DPW Deutsche Post AG  
DT Deutsche Telekom AG  
EAD European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company EADS N.V.  
EDF ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE  
EDP EDP - Energias de Portugal, S.A.  
ELTLX Aktiebolaget Electrolux  
ENEL ENEL S.P.A.  
ENI ENI S.P.A.  
EON E.ON AG  
EXPGRL-EXPFIN EXPERIAN FINANCE PLC  
FERRUZ EDISON S.P.A.  
FINMEC FINMECCANICA S.P.A.  
FORTUM Fortum Oyj  
FRTEL FRANCE TELECOM  
GASSM GAS NATURAL SDG, S.A.  
GDFS GDF SUEZ  
GLCORE Glencore International AG  
GROUPE CASINO GUICHARD-PERRACHON  
HANRUE Hannover Rueckversicherung AG  
HENAGK Henkel AG & Co. KGaA  
HOLZSW Holcim Ltd  
IBERDU IBERDROLA, S.A.  
IMPTOB IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC  
JTI JTI (UK) FINANCE PLC  
KDSM Koninklijke DSM N.V.  
KINGFI KINGFISHER PLC  
KPN Koninklijke KPN N.V.  
LINDE Linde Aktiengesellschaft  
LLOYDS-Bank LLOYDS TSB BANK plc  
LNX LANXESS Aktiengesellschaft  
METFNL METRO AG  
MICH-CoFinMich Compagnie Financiere Michelin  
MKS-M+SPlc MARKS AND SPENCER p.l.c.  
MOET LVMH MOET HENNESSY LOUIS VUITTON  
MONTE BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA 
S.P.A.  
MUNRE  
NESTLE Nestle S.A.  
NGP NATIONAL GRID PLC  
NOKIA Nokia Oyj  
NXT NEXT PLC  
PHG Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.  
PLTMPL-IntFin Portugal Telecom International 
Finance B.V.  
PPR PPR  
PSON PEARSON plc  
PUBFP PUBLICIS GROUPE SA  
RBOS-RBOSplc  
REEDLN REED ELSEVIER PLC  
REP REPSOL YPF, S.A.  
RNTKIL RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC  
ROLLS ROLLS-ROYCE plc  
RWE RWE Aktiengesellschaft  
SANPAO INTESA SANPAOLO SPA  
SANTNDR BANCO SANTANDER, S.A.  
SASY SANOFI-AVENTIS  
SCACAP Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget SCA  
SIEM Siemens Aktiengesellschaft  
SOCGEN SOCIETE GENERALE  
SOLVAY Solvay  
STGOBN COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN  
STM STMicroelectronics N.V.  
SUEDZU Suedzucker Aktiengesellschaft 
Mannheim/Ochsenfurt  
SWEMAT Swedish Match AB  
SWREL Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd  
TATELN TATE & LYLE PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY  
TELEFO TELEFONICA, S.A.  
TELNOR TELENOR ASA  
TIIMN TELECOM ITALIA SPA  
TKA Telekom Austria Aktiengesellschaft  
TLIASS TeliaSonera Aktiebolag  
TNT TNT N.V.  
TOTALN TOTAL SA  
TSCO TESCO PLC  
UBS UBS AG  
ULVR Unilever N.V.  
USPA UNICREDIT, SOCIETA PER AZIONI  
UU UNITED UTILITIES PLC  
VATFAL Vattenfall Aktiebolag  
VEOLIA VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT  
VINCI VINCI  
VIVNDI VIVENDI  
VLVY Aktiebolaget Volvo  
VOD VODAFONE GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY  
VW VOLKSWAGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT  
WOLKLU Wolters Kluwer N.V.  
WPPGRP-2005 WPP 2005 LIMITED  
XSTR XSTRATA PLC  
ZINCO Zurich Insurance Company Ltd 
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2. Acquisitions 
Announce 
Date 
Entity Name Target Acquirer Industry Class Target Industry Class 
2010/10/20 BAE SYSTEMS PLC OASYS Technology LLC Aerospace & Defence Aerospace & Defence 
2010/10/14 TELECOM ITALIA SPA Sofora Telecomunicaciones S.A. Integrated Telecommunication Integrated Telecommunication 
2010/10/05 BNP PARIBAS BNP Paribas Energy Trading GP Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2010/10/01 Publicis Groupe SA 20:20 MEDIA & 2020Social Advertising Advertising 
2010/09/30 France Telecom Elettra TLC S.p.A. Integrated Telecommunication Supplier to Telecom 
2010/09/24 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Republic Intelligent Transportation Services Inc. Electronic Equipment Manufacturer Other 
2010/09/22 
EnBW Energie Baden-
Wuerttemberg AG 
Prazska energetika a.s. Electric Utilities Electric Utilities 
2010/08/27 Deutsche Post AG nugg.ad AG Air Freight & Logistics Online Advertising 
2010/08/20 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Medical Products Corporation Consumer Electronics Consumer Products 
2010/08/17 Compass Group PLC § Restaurants Restaurants 
2010/08/03 Pearson Plc America's Choice Inc Publishing Publishing 
2010/08/02 Publicis Groupe SA AG2 Advertising Advertising 
2010/08/02 Nestle S.A. Vitaflo International Limited Packaged Foods & Meats Healthcare 
2010/07/29 Pearson Plc WSI International, Inc Publishing Education 
2010/07/29 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Shanghai Apex Electronics Technology Co., Ltd. Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2010/07/15 CARREFOUR Hebei Baolongcang Group Co., Ltd. Hypermarkets & Super Hypermarkets & Super 
2010/07/12 Publicis Groupe SA G4 Advertising Co. Ltd. Advertising Advertising 
2010/07/02 
Lvmh Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton 
Sack's.com Apparel, Accessories Apparel, Accessories 
2010/06/30 SANOFI-AVENTIS TargeGen Inc. Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2010/06/29 DIAGEO PLC London Group, LLC Distillers & Vintners Distillers & Vintners 
2010/06/23 BASF SE Cognis Holding Luxembourg S.a.r.l. Diversified Chemicals Diversified Chemicals 
2010/06/09 BANCO SANTANDER, S.A. Grupo Financiero Santander Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2010/06/08 Compass Group PLC Southeast Service Corporation Restaurants Cleaning 
2010/06/07 Zurich Insurance Company Ltd PT Mayapada Life Property & Casualty Insurance Property & Casualty Insurance 
2010/06/01 ELECTRICITE DE FRANCE SPE-Luminus Electric Utilities Electric Utilities 
2010/05/19 Publicis Groupe SA Resolute Communications Ltd. Advertising Advertising 
2010/05/19 Pearson Plc Melorio plc Publishing Education 
2010/05/18 BNP PARIBAS Hill Street Capital LLC Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2010/05/18 BAE SYSTEMS PLC Atlantic Marine Holding Company Aerospace & Defence Shipyard 
2010/05/07 GDF SUEZ Utilicom Group Gas Utilities Supplier to Gas 
2010/05/05 Compass Group PLC Caterine Restauration S.A.S Restaurants Restaurants 
2010/04/29 UBS AG Link Holding Financeira S.A. Diversified Banks 
 
2010/04/29 Publicis Groupe SA W&K Beijing Advertising Co., Ltd. Advertising Advertising 
2010/04/27 VIVENDI GVT (Holding) SA Multi-Sector Holdings Telecom 
2010/04/13 Centrica PLC Hillserve Limited Multi-Utilities Insular 
2010/04/06 Publicis Groupe SA in-sync Consumer Insight Corp. Advertising Advertising 
2010/03/29 COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN MAG Building Products Building Products 
2010/03/24 Deutsche Telekom AG Firstgate Holding AG Integrated Telecommunication Integrated Telecommunication 
2010/03/18 AVIVA PLC PT Asuransi Winterthur Life Indonesia Multi-Line Insurance Multi-Line Insurance 
2010/03/04 Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft Bank Forum JSC Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2010/02/26 Nestle S.A. LLC Technocom Packaged Foods & Meats Packaged Foods & Meats 
2010/02/18 SOCIETE GENERALE Sogessur Diversified Banks Insurance 
2010/02/11 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Luceplan SpA Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2010/02/03 Pearson Plc Medley Global Advisors LLC Publishing 
 
2010/02/02 COMPAGNIE DE SAINT-GOBAIN SolarWood Technologies S.A Building Products Building Products 
2009/12/23 TELEFONICA, S.A. JAJAH Inc. Integrated Telecommunication 
 
2009/12/21 SANOFI-AVENTIS Chattem, Inc. Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/12/10 DANONE Danone Clover Packaged Foods & Meats Packaged Foods & Meats 
2009/11/25 TELEFONICA, S.A. Digital+ Integrated Telecommunication TV 
2009/11/05 TELEFONICA, S.A. HanseNet Telekommunikation GmbH Integrated Telecommunication Integrated Telecommunication 
2009/10/30 SANOFI-AVENTIS Laboratoire Oenobiol SA Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/10/28 Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. S.C.A. Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2009/10/27 
Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget 
SCA 
Algodonera Aconcagua S.A. Household Products Household Products 
2009/10/19 Pearson Plc A+RISE Publishing Education 
2009/10/15 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Solel Solar Systems Ltd. Electronic Equipment Manufacturer 
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacturer 
2009/10/01 SANOFI-AVENTIS Fovea Pharmaceuticals SA Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/10/01 Holcim Ltd Cemex Australia Holdings Pty. Limited Construction Materials Construction Materials 
2009/09/03 Publicis Groupe SA The Womens Forum for the Economy & Society Advertising - 
2009/08/13 
VOLKSWAGEN 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
Porsche AG Automobile Manufacture Automobile Manufacture 
2009/08/13 
National Bank and Trust 
Company/The 
La Tour du Pin & Cheval Blanc SA 
  
2009/08/09 Publicis Groupe SA Razorfish, Inc. Advertising Advertising 
2009/08/07 Centrica PLC British Energy Group plc Multi-Utilities Multi-Utilities 
2009/08/03 Centrica PLC Newnova Group Ltd Multi-Utilities Multi-Utilities 
2009/07/30 SANOFI-AVENTIS Merial Limited Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/07/16 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Teletrol Systems Inc. Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2009/07/13 Koninklijke KPN N.V. iBasis, Inc. Integrated Telecommunication Integrated Telecommunication 
2009/07/07 E.On AG Societe Conilhac Energies S.A.S. Industrial Conglomerat - 
2009/07/01 Koninklijke KPN N.V. Talk &Vision Integrated Telecommunication Tech 
2009/06/23 Aegon N.V. BT AEGON Life & Health Insurance Life & Health Insurance 
2009/06/17 British American Tobacco P.L.C. PT Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk Tobacco Tobacco 
2009/06/16 DIAGEO PLC Stirrings LLC Distillers & Vintners Distillers & Vintners 
2009/06/05 TNT N.V. Mikropakket Nederland BV Air Freight & Logistics Air Freight & Logistics 
2009/06/01 Centrica PLC Energy and Building Management Solutions Limited Multi-Utilities Multi-Utilities 
2009/05/25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Saeco International Group S.p.A. Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2009/05/20 Publicis Groupe SA Publicis MARC Group Advertising Advertising 
2009/05/19 Daimler AG Tesla Motors Inc Automobile Manufacture Automobile Manufacture 
2009/05/15 
Lvmh Moet Hennessy Louis 
Vuitton 
Edun Apparel Ltd Apparel, Accessories Apparel, Accessories 
2009/05/12 BNP PARIBAS Fortis Bank Diversified Banks Diversified Banks 
2009/05/04 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Traxtal Inc Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2009/04/30 TOTAL SA Gevo Integrated Oil & Gas Integrated Oil & Gas 
2009/04/28 TNT N.V. Espresso Aracatuba Transportes e Logistica S.A. Air Freight & Logistics Air Freight & Logistics 
2009/04/16 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. Union Fenosa S.A. Gas Utilities Gas Utilities 
2009/04/15 SANOFI-AVENTIS BiPar Sciences Inc Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/04/09 SANOFI-AVENTIS Medley SA Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 
2009/04/09 Pearson Plc Intellipro, Inc. & National Transcript Center Publishing Education 
2009/04/07 Reed Elsevier Plc Professional Development Software, Inc Publishing Education 
2009/04/07 Publicis Groupe SA Nemos GmbH Advertising Advertising 
2009/04/01 Siemens Aktiengesellschaft Elan Software Systems SA Electronic Equipment Manufacturer 
Electronic Equipment 
Manufacturer 
2009/04/01 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. 
Selecon North America LLC & Selecon New Zealand 
Limited & Selecon UK Limited & Aureol Lighting Limited 
Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2009/04/01 Centrica PLC Econergy Ltd Multi-Utilities Multi-Utilities 
2009/03/25 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Dynalite Inc Consumer Electronics Consumer Electronics 
2009/03/16 TNT N.V. LIT Cargo Air Freight & Logistics Air Freight & Logistics 
2009/03/12 BAE SYSTEMS PLC Advanced Ceramic Research, Inc. Aerospace & Defence Aerospace & Defence 
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3. Graphs 
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